Krzysztof Burdzy, Department of Mathematics, University of Washington.
"Remarks on the philosophy of Bayesian decision making."
Monday, November 13 2000
Communications 120 at 3:30 P.M.

Abstract

I believe that Bayesian probabilists use an unstated axiom in their textbook examples and practical applications. The axiom is far from obvious and thus destroys the claim of the Bayesian approach to be based on an axiomatic system. The second part of the talk will be concerned with a thought experiment showing that a Bayesian decision maker is forced in some circumstances to identify himself with an abstract group of people (as opposed to a real group). The analysis showing sub-optimality of the Bayesian decision will be made from the frequentist point of view.

The talk will be entirely based on the notes available at http://www.math.washington.edu/~burdzy/Bayes/welcome.html.

Discussant:
Matthew Stephens, Department of Statistics, University of Washington.

Refreshments to follow in the Statistics lounge, 3rd floor, Padelford.